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Abstract
Many rent-sharing decisions in a society result from a bargaining process between groups
of individuals (such as between the executive and the legislative branches of government,
between legislative factions, between corporate management and shareholders, etc.). We
conduct a laboratory study of the e⁄ect of di⁄erent voting procedures on group decision-
making in the context of ultimatum bargaining. Earlier studies have suggested that when
the bargaining game is played by unstructured groups of agents, rather than by individuals,
the division of the payo⁄ is substantially a⁄ected in favor of the ultimatum-proposers. Our
theoretical arguments suggest that one explanation for this could be implicit voting rules
within groups. We explicitly structure the group decision-making as voting and study
the impact of di⁄erent voting rules on the bargaining outcome. The observed responder
behavior is consistent with preferences depending solely on payo⁄distribution. Furthermore,
we observe that proposers react in an expected manner to changes in voting rule in the
responder group.
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11 Introduction
Many common bargaining situations, such as those that occur between the executive
and the legislative branches of government, between legislative factions, between cor-
porate management and shareholders, are interactions between groups rather than
individuals. Consequently, in modeling applications of bargaining one or both sides
are frequently best viewed as amalgamations of agents.1
We study group behavior in the context of ultimatum bargaining. In this game,
one side proposes how to partition a total available payo⁄between itself and the other
side, who, in turn can accept or reject the proposal. In case of acceptance the proposal
is implemented, while in case of rejection neither side receives anything. As is well-
known, the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is for the ultimatum-proposer to
receive (almost) the entire surplus. In contrast, in laboratory implementation of the
game, ultimatum-responders consistently obtain a signi￿cant, though smaller, share.
Our motivation is to explore how ultimatum bargaining between groups di⁄ers
from that between individuals, and to compare the impact of di⁄erent rules for aggre-
gating individual preferences into group decisions. If such impact is non-negligible,
it has general implications for bargaining between groups using di⁄erent explicit vot-
ing rules to agree on intra-group decisions, and may help identify implicit preference
aggregation mechanisms used in groups that do not have explicit rules. Additionally,
a laboratory study of group bargaining provides a new test of the models that have
been proposed to explain individual behavior in bargaining situations.
Our experimental observations can be summarized in two propositions. First,
individual responder behavior across treatments can be explained by agents caring
about the monetary payo⁄s of the proposers (in addition to their own). Second, we
observe that proposer behavior signi￿cantly depends (in the manner predicted by
our model) on the intra-group decision rule in force among the responders, and is
generally di⁄erent from the proposer behavior in the one-on-one bargaining. This
1Chae and Heidhues [7] note that in a recent sample of papers published in the AER and the
JPE, 15 out of 22 papers considered a group as one or both bargainers.
2suggests that subjects are able to internalize the di⁄erent nature of the responders
across the treatments.
While, as noted above, many bargaining situations involve interaction between
groups, there are relatively few theoretical studies in economics or political science
that explicitly concern themselves with the distinctions between group and individ-
ual interaction. When group bargaining situations are modeled, the above behav-
ioral ￿ndings are frequently simply assumed. The examples are too numerous to be
surveyed here. To cite a well-known study, Romer and Rosenthal [24],[25] in their
work on political resource allocation assume that the monopoly agenda-setter e⁄ec-
tively bargains with the median voter, thus internalizing the majority voting used
in a democracy. A recent theoretical study comparing di⁄erent intra-group decision
rules in political models of intergroup bargaining by Haller and Holden [13], consid-
ers the impact of varying majority rule requirements for parliamentary rati￿cation
of international agreements. They conclude that supermajority rati￿cation require-
ments may advantageously a⁄ect countries￿negotiating positions and claim this to
be a plausible reason for the empirical emergence of such constitutional provisions
and practices in various countries. More recently, Manzini and Mariotti [18] suggest
that unanimity-based decision-rules within alliances should make them more success-
ful in negotiations compared with coalitions governed by majority rule. We believe
that our experimental ￿ndings provide some support to the theoretical conclusions of
these papers.
The issue of intergroup interaction in games has received a lot of attention from
social psychologists. In a recent paper Wildschut et al. [28] provide a ￿meta-study￿
of a large body (some 130 studies) of experimental evidence on what is known in
psychology as the group discontinuity e⁄ect: the general tendency of groups of agents
to behave more aggressively than individuals in similar circumstances, whether due
to social reinforcement of aggressive behavior, greater anonymity within the group,
or fear of aggressive behavior by the opposing group. It is only recently that the
issue has been taken up by economists, who compared the degree to which group and
3individual play conforms to the game-theoretic predictions. Bornstein and Yaniv [2]
￿nd indications of more aggressive proposer behavior in group ultimatum games, while
Bornstein et al. [3] see earlier group exit in the centipede game, both pointing towards
the backward induction outcomes of these games. Similarly, Cox [9] observes that in
an investment game group decisions correspond to those of their most aggressive
members, which makes them most closely ￿game-theoretic￿ in terms of monetary
payo⁄s. Kocher and Sutter [15] observe more aggressive group behavior to prevail in
a gift-exchange experiment even when group members are not allowed any face-to-face
interaction but reach a decision via a computer communication protocol. In contrast,
in a context of the dictator game Cason and Mui [6] observe that more generous (other-
regarding) agents dominate group decisions. Overall, the issue remains unsettled, and
Camerer [5] includes further study of the manner in which groups act in games as one
of the ten top open research questions in behavioral economics.
One di¢ culty in studies of intergroup interaction is that the intra-group decision-
making may be di¢ cult to observe or categorize, unless it is explicitly imposed. But
imposing some preference aggregation rule may have a direct impact on the way the
game is played. Thus, Wildschut et al. [28] conclude that when a group has to reach
a single decision (typically, unanimously) agents tend to behave more in accordance
with the discontinuity hypothesis than when the group outcome is achieved as a sum of
decentralized individual decisions. A distinct question is to what extent centralized
intra-group decision rules matter. Here the evidence so far is extremely limited.
While the decision rule would a⁄ect a group￿ s decision, it is another matter if this
is understood and internalized by the opposing group. In a few studies that posed
this question previously, as in Messick et al. [19], and in a very recent study by
Bosman et al. [4], the answer seems to be negative: members of a group tend to
view the opposing group as unitary and ignore its decision process. On the whole,
the issue remains underexplored, and our study seems to challenge some of the earlier
conclusions.
The one-on-one ultimatum bargaining game has been repeatedly played in labo-
4ratory settings, beginning with Guth et al. [12], and a number of robust regularities
has emerged, as summarized in Roth [26] and Camerer [5]. In particular, it has
been repeatedly observed that, at least in industrialized societies, the proposers of
the ultimatum tend to o⁄er the responders a sizeable chunk of the payo⁄ (often
in excess of 40%), while the low o⁄ers get consistently rejected by the responders.
While at variance with the subgame-perfect equilibrium prediction for a game with
purely monetary payo⁄s, it could be explained by an uncontrolled non-monetary pay-
o⁄ component, such as utility of fairness or of punishing ￿insulting￿o⁄ers. This is
the conclusion Ochs and Roth [20] draw from a series of sequential bargaining exper-
iments. In fact, for a number of such experiments, Prasnikar and Roth [21] suggest
that ultimatum-proposers may be trying to maximize monetary payo⁄ subject to
the empirical rejection behavior of ultimatum-responders, which, in turn, might be
generated by unobserved (and uncontrolled) payo⁄s.
Kennan and Wilson [16] suggested that ￿[e]ven the basic single-o⁄er ultimatum
game becomes a game of private information in which the optimal o⁄er depends on
beliefs about how much the responder is willing to forgo to punish unfair behavior￿ .
In other words, laboratory bargaining games should be modeled as incomplete in-
formation games, which in the ultimatum game context may be done by explicitly
modeling rejection thresholds as responder types. This has been formalized in studies
such as Levine [17], who incorporated altruism and/or spitefulness into individual
preferences; Bolton and Ockenfels [1], who allow the agents to care about their rel-
ative position in the society; and in the fairness model of Fehr and Schmidt [10].
In these models, the agents may only be aware of the preference distribution in the
population, but not of the actual types they face. In the context of the ultimatum
bargaining, this generates an incomplete information game with ultimatum-proposers
having beliefs about the rejection probability of any given ultimatum. In this paper
we provide a simple model in the spirit of Bolton and Ockenfels [1] and Fehr and
Schmidt [10], narrowly targeted to provide comparative empirical predictions for our
experiment.
5Until recently all laboratory ultimatum bargaining games have been implemented
in a one-on-one setting. A 1998 study (Bornstein and Yaniv [2]) has suggested that
when the ultimatum game is played by unstructured groups of agents, rather than
by individuals, the division of the payo⁄ is substantially a⁄ected in favor of the
ultimatum-proposers. In their language, this result can be explained by thinking of
groups as ￿more rational￿agents than individuals, if rationality is viewed as being
closer to the subgame-perfect outcome of the ultimatum game with pure monetary
payo⁄s. In a concluding remark they suggest that an alternative explanation could
be that ultimatum proposers take into account an implicit decision-making process
of the responder group (such as, perhaps, majority voting). This conjecture cannot
be tested without either a control for or an explicit model of such a process.
A couple of papers have attempted to deal with the issue of intra-group decision-
making. Robert and Carnevale [23] observe that in a group-on-group ultimatum game
that proposer groups tend to follow the preferences of its ￿most competitive￿mem-
ber.2 The result is a substantially more aggressive proposer group behavior, as in
Bornstein and Yaniv [2]. Unfortunately, their responder groups are ￿ctitious, and
the proposers don￿ t explicitly observe rejections; it is thus impossible to ￿gure out if
they are best-responding to anything on the responder side. A more explicit labora-
tory implementation of intra-group decision-making has been conducted by Messick
et al. [19], who compare group-on-group bargaining under two decision-making pro-
cedures in the responder group: in one treatment responders must unanimously agree
to accept the o⁄er, while in the other the unanimity is required for rejection. Some-
what surprisingly, they could not observe any di⁄erence in proposer behavior, even
though the best response in the former treatment seems to imply much less aggressive
ultimatums than in the latter.
While the previously mentioned studies look at single-shot bargaining between
inexperienced subjects, Grosskopf [11] studies behavior changes as agents learn from
their experience. Comparing one-on-one and one-on-group ultimatum bargaining
2They elicit the individual preferences from observations of one-on-one play by the same agents.
6under a group decision rule similar to one of the treatments in Messick et al.￿ s [19]
(unanimity required for rejection) she ￿nds that though the agents might not be able
to ￿gure out the di⁄erence immediately, with experience a clear di⁄erence emerges
between the play against groups versus play against individuals. In particular, she
observes that when playing against groups proposers eventually learn to be more
aggressive.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 develops a simple model of
ultimatum bargaining under incomplete information and derives testable predictions;
section 3 discusses experimental design; section 4 presents laboratory results; section
5 concludes.
2 The Model
We start by providing a simple incomplete information model of ultimatum bargain-
ing, speci￿ed to the extent we shall be able to implement it in the lab. Our model
most closely resembles those of Bolton and Ockenfels [1] and Fehr and Schmidt [10].
For simplicity, we shall assume that proposers care only about their monetary pay-
o⁄, while responders may have other motivations. Though relaxable, this assumption
can be somewhat justi￿ed by earlier experimental results, such as Prasnikar and Roth
[21], as discussed in Roth [26]. Likewise, Kagel et al. [14] observe that proposers be-
have more aggressively, if they know that responders don￿ t know the payo⁄ size and
so can￿ t ￿gure out if they are treated ￿unfairly￿or ￿insultingly￿by the proposers.
This suggests that when unfairness works in one￿ s favor, agents might not dislike it
so much, as long as they can￿ t be observed as unfair or punished for it. In the same
vein, Fehr and Schmidt [10] cite psychological literature to support the assumption
that people dislike unfairness that works in their favor less than they dislike the same
when it works against them. Since in ultimatum games proposers typically get at
least half the total payo⁄, we shall go further and suppress the fairness component of
their utility. Incorporating some sort of "fairness" preference in proposers￿utility does
7not present a serious di¢ culty, since it would only a⁄ect quantitative, but not quali-
tative predictions as to the comparative behavior of agents in di⁄erent treatments of
our experiment. Therefore, we assume that each (weakly) risk-averse proposer has a
strictly increasing and concave Bernoulli utility function of money up (xp), where xp
is how much money she gets.3
The responder also likes money, but in addition she gets utility from being treated
fairly. If she is facing a bad o⁄er, she will prefer to reject, since that would result
in a fairer distribution, or since it will punish the ￿insolent￿ proposer. We shall
remain agnostic on the true nature of the possible rejection since our experiment
is not designed to elicit this information. One possibility here is that the di⁄erence
between the payo⁄s of the proposer and the responder enters his utility, which is
thus ur (xr;xr ￿ xp), where xr is her monetary wealth. To the extent that there are
only two agents involved in actual play, the pair (xr;xr ￿ xp) describes the entire
monetary payo⁄ distribution between them. Therefore, our approach is equivalent
both to the Bolton and Ockenfels [1] assumption that the agents care about their
share of the total and the Fehr and Schmidt [10] assumption that they care about
absolute di⁄erences. We assume the function ur to be increasing in both arguments.
The total payo⁄ size available for sharing between a proposer and a responder is
￿ > 0. The proposer has to choose a number x 2 [0;￿] that she will o⁄er to the
responder, with the balance of ￿ ￿ x being left to herself. The responder will accept
the o⁄er whenever
ur (x;2x ￿ ￿) ￿ u(0;0)
and reject otherwise.4
If the proposer knows preferences of the responder, the subgame-perfect equilib-
3It should be stressed that our results hold for either risk-neutral or risk-averse agents. We are
aware of the controversy about risk-aversion with usual laboratory-sized payo⁄s (see Rabin[22]),
but since our results do not depend on it, we choose to allow the possibility of concave utilities.
Replacing risk-aversion with loss-aversion would not a⁄ect the results.
4We assume acceptance in case of indi⁄erence; since it is a zero-probability event in the incomplete
information version of the game, this assumption is innocuous.
8rium is obvious. The proposer should choose x￿ 2 [0;￿] that solves.
ur (x
￿;2x
￿ ￿ ￿) = u(0;0)







Of course, the proposer can￿ t ex ante observe the responder￿ s preferences. The
only things subject to observation and experimental control are the monetary o⁄er
x and the total prize ￿. Therefore, the only thing known to the proposer is that
each responder ￿ will reject o⁄ers below a certain cut-o⁄ value x￿ and that this x￿ is
drawn from some probability distribution with the support [0;￿] with the distribution
function F (x).5 Clearly, F (x) can be interpreted as the acceptance probability of
o⁄er x.
We shall denote the probability of rejection P (x) = 1 ￿ F (x). Suppose that
P (￿) = 0 (if you give everything to the responder she always accepts) and P (0) =
1 (o⁄ers of nothing are always rejected), both of which are very robust empirical
regularities observed in ultimatum game experiments. These assumptions clearly
imply impossibility of corner solutions to the proposer￿ s maximization problem. The
proposer￿ s expected payo⁄ from the ultimatum x is
￿(x) = up (￿ ￿ x)(1 ￿ P (x))
Assuming di⁄erentiability of up and P, clearly u0
p ￿ 0 and P 0 ￿ 0. The ￿rst order
necessary condition for expected utility maximization in the interior is
u
0
p (￿ ￿ x)(1 ￿ P(x)) = ￿up (￿ ￿ x)P
0(x)





. This seems to be con￿rmed empirically, since large o⁄ers almost
never get rejected. On the other hand, o⁄ers above the half of the total prize, though rare, do occur,






. Perhaps, some proposers have a di⁄erent model of recipients in mind, which
allows for higher cuto⁄s.
9Furthermore, a necessary condition for maximization is P (x) < 1 (since P (x) = 1
would guarantee a zero payo⁄). The ￿rst order conditions are easily seen to be
su¢ cient if P (x) is convex at x.
2.1 Group bargaining
The group bargaining framework has to be designed as closely as possible to the one-
on-one treatment in order to minimize any unmodelled di⁄erence in behavior. For this
reason, we preserve the symmetry between the sides by assuming the same group size
of proposers and responders and equipartition of the monetary payo⁄ within each
side. This avoids either payo⁄ scale di⁄erences or public good/ e¢ ciency aspects
which would be inevitable if the symmetry were to be broken.
Consider the ultimatum bargaining between groups of three proposers and three
responders for a prize 3￿. The proposers￿share of the prize will be divided equally
between the proposers and the responders￿share between the responders. An ulti-
matum x shall mean that each proposer gets ￿ ￿ x, and each receiver gets x. Under
these conditions the pair (x;￿ ￿ x) continues to completely describe the distribution
of the monetary payo⁄s in case of acceptance.
In what follows we explore consequences of three intra-group decision rules among
the responders: majority decision to accept/ reject; unanimity needed to overturn
acceptance; unanimity needed to overturn rejection.6
In general, the voting games played by the responders will have multiple equilibria,
since, for instance, if I believe that all my partners in a group always vote to accept
and the decision rule is majority, I am indi⁄erent between voting to accept and
to reject. Note, however, that such equilibria in a one-shot voting game involve
playing weakly dominated strategies. In fact, for a voter facing an ultimatum x doing
6We could have considered another alternative: the dictatorship (one agent chosen to make the
decision to accept or reject for the entire group). Note though a recent paper by Charness and
Jackson [8], who ￿nd in the context of the Stag Hunt games that the dictator group-on-group game
may be played di⁄erently from the one-on-one game (at least as far as equilibrium selection is
concerned) due to a feeling of responsibility on the part of the dictator. We do not model it here
though, so the dictator rule would be equivalent to the one-on-one game.
10anything other than voting sincerely is weakly dominated by sincere voting (this is
an election between just two alternatives). Therefore, we shall only consider sincere
voting equilibria. Clearly, in such equilibria the outside observer￿ s ex ante probability
P (x) of an agent voting to reject an o⁄er x is constant across the treatments. We
shall take this to be the ￿rst comparative static prediction of our model.
The above discussion provides an additional reason to give up on eliciting the
entire strategies of responders (as attempted, for instance, by Messick et al. [19]):
even the simple cut-o⁄acceptance/ rejection strategies are relatively complex objects
and if voting over them would be allowed, empirically disentangling the multiple
equilibria could be hard. On the other hand, at their action node the responders face
a simple binary decision: accept or reject the o⁄er in front of them. Unfortunately,
the action of proposers is more complicated: they have to choose a number in the
[0;￿] interval. As in the responder case, we want to avoid voting complications and/or
having to impose an elaborate voting protocol in the lab. For this reason, given a
more complicated decision facing the proposers, we shall let each proposer make his
ultimatum ignorant of the rest, and then randomly choose one of the ultimatums to
be presented to the responders. In this case individual￿ s proposal only matters, on
average, a third of the time. However, unless the proposer has some non-monetary
motivation, it is optimal for him to make decisions as if he were alone: either he does
not matter, or his decision problem is unchanged.
Since, as discussed above, we expect individual responder behavior P (x) to be
constant across treatments, group rejection probabilities should vary predictably with
the group decision rule. The following table summarizes the rejection probability
under each of the four intra-group decision rules on the ultimatum responder side:
11Group Decision Rule Default Probability of Rejection
Individual Response - P(x)
Majority Rule - P 3(x) + 3P 2(x)(1 ￿ P(x))
Unanimity Rule Accept P 3(x)
Unanimity Rule Reject 1 ￿ (1 ￿ P(x))3
This implies, that the proposer￿ s expected utilities for the ultimatum x are as
follows:
Group Decision Rule Default Expected Utility: ￿(x)
Individual Response - up(￿ ￿ x)(1 ￿ P(x))
Majority Rule - up(￿ ￿ x)(1 ￿ P(x))2(1 + 2P(x))
Unanimity Rule Accept up(￿ ￿ x)(1 ￿ P 3(x))
Unanimity Rule Reject up(￿ ￿ x)(1 ￿ P(x))3
The ￿rst order necessary conditions for expected utility maximization, simpli￿ed
by noticing that P (x) < 1 in the optimum and dividing both sides by equal positive
factors, are as follows:
Group Decision Rule Default FOC Expected Utility Maximization
Individual Response - u
0
p(￿ ￿ x)(1 ￿ P(x)) = ￿up(￿ ￿ x)P
0(x)
Majority Rule - u
0
p(￿ ￿ x)(1 ￿ P(x))(1 + 2P(x)) = ￿6up(￿ ￿ x)P
0(x)P(x)
Unanimity Rule Accept u
0
p(￿ ￿ x)(1 ￿ P 3(x)) = ￿3up(￿ ￿ x)P
0(x)P 2(x)
Unanimity Rule Reject u
0
p(￿ ￿ x)(1 ￿ P(x)) = ￿3up(￿ ￿ x)P
0(x)
Without a further assumption on P, multiple local maxima are possible. Though
global maximum, generically (in either P or u), would be unique, multiplicity of local
12maxima might allow the global maximum to ￿jump￿depending on the voting rule,
which might create problems with identifying the impact of the rules. Unfortunately,
P is not directly observable, either by the experimenters or by the subjects. The
following assumption, which is satis￿ed by most ￿symmetric￿ models of rejection
probability (such as linear, logit or probit), would avoid this problem.
Assumption A: P (x) is (weakly) convex whenever P (x) ￿ 1
2.
Let xUAD be an agent￿ s optimal proposal when the responder decision is taken
under the unanimity with acceptance default, xURD - the same for the unanimity
with rejection default and xMR - for the majority rule; ￿nally let xI be the optimal
proposal in the standard one-on-one bargaining. We can now state the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 Let assumption A hold. The optimal o⁄ers by any risk-averse indi-
vidual in each treatment will be ranked as follows :
xUAD < xI < xMR < xURD; if P (x) >
1
4
xUAD < xMR < xI < xURD; if P (x) <
1
4
Proof. The proof is done by comparing the ￿rst order conditions. Since it has been
assumed that P (0) = 1;P (￿) = 0, the solution is interior. Furthermore, assumption
A ensures that, as long as P (x) ￿ 1
2, the ￿rst order conditions are su¢ cient and
that there is at most one local maximum for each voting rule in this range. But
for all voting rules, other than unanimity with acceptance default, this must be the






o⁄ering to share the prize equally, which, as has been discussed above, will always be
accepted.
13Consider now the optimal o⁄er xI in the one-on-one game. Then
u
0
p (￿ ￿ xI)(1 ￿ P(xI)) = ￿up (￿ ￿ xI)P
0(xI)
Comparing this with the ￿rst order condition for the unanimity with acceptance
default game, observe that
u
0





> ￿3up (￿ ￿ xI)P
0 (xI)P
2 (xI)
as long as P (xI) < 1. Since o⁄ering a proposal that would spur rejection with
probability one cannot be optimal for the proposer, the inequality must hold. The
right-hand side is decreasing in x, the left is increasing in x, hence to restore equality
x has to be decreased for the optimum in the unanimity (with acceptance default)
case to be achieved. Though unanimity with acceptance default is the only rule
considered here for which the true global maximum might involve P (x) > 1
2, that
would imply even more aggressive behavior by the proposers, so that the conclusion
that xUAD < xI is maintained.
Similarly, for the unanimity with rejection default game
u
0
p (￿ ￿ xI)(1 ￿ P(xI)) < ￿3up (￿ ￿ xI)P
0 (xI)
and x has to be increased to get to the optimum (unique, since in this case, as noted
above, P (x) ￿ 1
2 must hold at the maximum).
We have established that xUAD < xI < xURD. It can be similarly shown that
xUAD < xMR < xURD. To establish the position of xMR vis a vis xI observe that
u
0
p (￿ ￿ xI)(1 ￿ P (xI))(1 + 2P (xI)) > ￿6up (￿ ￿ xI)P






p (￿ ￿ xI)(1 ￿ P (xI))(1 + 2P (xI)) < ￿6up (￿ ￿ xI)P
0 (xI)P (xI), if P (x) >
1
4
14To see the necessary direction of change of x divide both sides of the previous in-
equality condition by P (x) > 0 to get
u0
p (￿ ￿ xI)
P (xI)
(1 ￿ P (xI))(1 + 2P (xI)) < (>) ￿ 6up (￿ ￿ xI)P
0 (xI)
with the left-hand side increasing and the right hand side decreasing in x.
Empirical predictions summarized by the Proposition 1 admit a broad array of the
shapes of u and P. Furthermore, the (weak) risk-aversion and (weak) convexity of P
in the relevant part of the domain are not necessary and could be further relaxed.
Predictions for the play against the unanimity groups are very straightforward;
less so with the case of the majority rule. Equilibrium o⁄ers depend on the proposers￿
degree of risk-aversion and the shape of the rejection probability P (x), both of which
are hard to control in an experiment. Both o⁄ers that face higher and lower rejection
probability than 1
4 are likely to be observed. However, we do have a qualitative
prediction in that the less aggressive proposers in the one-on-one treatment should
become somewhat more aggressive when playing against majority-rule groups, while
the initially more ￿aggressive￿proposers are predicted to moderate their behavior
somewhat in this case (though they would still be relatively more aggressive than the
initially less aggressive types).
Our comparative statics prediction on group action is contingent on the individual
rejection probability P (x) being constant across treatments. This, in turn, crucially
depends on the agents caring only about monetary payo⁄ distributions in the game.
Thus, for instance, if the agents get utility from voting to reject even when it has no
impact on payo⁄ distribution (one could term this "punishment" or "expression of
annoyance" utility), then being in a group would make negative votes likelier, since
whenever an agent is non-pivotal the ￿no￿vote is costless. Clearly, this would imply
a higher P (x) in group treatments, as compared to the one-on-one case. It is quite
straightforward to develop the relevant comparative statics for this or other alternative
theories. The reason we do not make the model in this paper general enough to
15incorporate such possibilities is simply that in our experimental results we ￿nd no
evidence for the individual rejection probability P (x) varying across treatments, so
that the simple model in this section is the one most consistent with our observations.
3 Experimental Design
3.1 Structure of the Ultimatum Bargaining
Our experimental design looks at the outcomes of the ultimatum bargaining game
when two groups of players have to bargain over an amount of money: a group of 3
players ("proposers") suggests a division of a ￿xed amount of money, and a second
group of 3 players ("responders"), accepts or rejects it. After observing the proposal,
responders must decide whether to accept or reject it following a pre-determined
voting rule. If responders reject the proposal, no group receives any pay, and if
responders accept, each group receives the amount speci￿ed in the proposal.
Each voting rule speci￿es a treatment for our group-on-group ultimatum bargain-
ing. We consider the following three voting rules:
Unanimity with Rejection Default (URD): An o⁄er is considered accepted
when every member of the responder group votes to accept it. Otherwise it is con-
sidered rejected.
Unanimity with Acceptance Default (UAD): An o⁄er is considered rejected
when every member of the responder group votes to accept it. Otherwise it is con-
sidered accepted.
Majority Rule (MR): An o⁄er is considered accepted when at least two mem-
bers of the responder group votes to accept it. Otherwise it is considered rejected.
As a control treatment, we use a standard one-on-one ultimatum bargaining, where
an agent, the proposer, suggests a division of a ￿xed amount of money, and a second
agent, the responder, accepts or rejects it. If the responder rejects, no individual
receives any pay, and if he accepts, each individual receives the amount speci￿ed in
the proposal. In total, the voting rules and the control de￿ne the 4 treatments of
16Table 1: Independent Design
Experimental Treatments of Group # of Subjects
the Ultimatum Bargaining Size per Session
Standard One-on-One 1 24 and 30
Unanimity with Rejection Default 3 30 and 30
Unanimity with Acceptance Default 3 30 and 30
Majority Rule 3 24 and 30
Table 2: Sequential Design
First Ultimatum Group # of Subjects Second Ultimatum Group # of Subjects
Bargaining Size per Session Bargaining Size per Session
One-on-One 1 28+ Majority Rule 3 24
Majority Rule 3 24 One-on-One 1 24
+: Four subjects were randomly excluded after the one-on-one session in order
to have an even number of groups in the group-on-group ultimatum bargaining.
what we shall call the independent design.
In addition, in order to test the model￿ s prediction that a less (more) aggres-
sive proposer in a one-on-one ultimatum bargaining becomes somewhat more (less)
aggressive when playing against groups, we consider a sequential design with two
treatments: in the ￿rst treatment, a one-on-one ultimatum bargaining is followed by
a group-on-group ultimatum bargaining where the responder groups have to decide
whether to accept using the majority voting rule. In the second treatment, we reverse
the order by having the subjects play majority-rule group-on-group bargaining game
before the one-on-one game.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize for each experimental design the treatments, the group
size, and the number of subjects per session.
3.2 Design Parameters
This section describes the general experimental procedure.
17Participants and Venue. Subjects were drawn from a wide cross￿ section of under-
graduate students at Instituto Tecnol￿gico Aut￿nomo de MØxico (ITAM) in Mexico
City. The recruitment was done from among those enrolled in introductory classes, in
order to avoid those exposed to higher-level economics courses, such as game theory.
Each subject participated in only one session. The experiment was run at ITAM
using computers.
Number of Periods. In order to familiarize subjects with the procedures, two
practice periods were conducted before the 10 real (a⁄ecting monetary payo⁄) periods.
For the sequential design, two practice periods were conducted before the 10 real
periods in the ￿rst ultimatum bargaining, and one practice period was conducted
before the 10 real periods in the second ultimatum bargaining.
Agent Types. For each of the group-on-group treatments, each participant was des-
ignated as a member of a type A group (i.e., proposers) or a member of a type B group
(i.e., responders). For the one-on-one treatment, each participant was designated ei-
ther as a type A agent (i.e., proposer) or as a type B agent (i.e., responder) before the
beginning of the practice periods. All designations were determined randomly by the
computer at the beginning of the experimental session, and remained constant during
the entire session. For the sequential design, each participant type was determined
at the beginning of a session and preserved across bargaining situations.
Matching Procedure and Group Size. For each of the group-on-group treatments,
membership of each group was changed in a random fashion, so that each participant
formed part of a new group (of the same type) at the beginning of each period. Each
group consisted of three participants. For the one-on-one treatment, a type A agent
was paired with a type B agent, and each pairing was randomized for each period.
Furthermore, agents did not know who they were paired with in any given period.
Bargaining Procedure. Subjects were informed that they had to bargain over 100
points. For the group-on-group treatments, the task of each pair of groups was to
divide 100 points in each period using the following rules: a) group A had to make a
￿nal o⁄er of points to group B; b) to make a ￿nal o⁄er, each group A member had
18to write and send an o⁄er via computer, each o⁄er being in the range from 0 to 100
points; c) one of these o⁄ers was chosen randomly by the computer as group A ￿nal
o⁄er to group B; d) upon receiving the ￿nal o⁄er, group B members had to decide
whether to accept or reject the o⁄er according to the voting rule announced for this
session. No communication, except as explicitly discussed in this and next paragraph,
was allowed among participants. For the one-on-one treatment a type A agent had
to make and send an o⁄er to a type B agent, and after receiving the o⁄er, the type
B agent had to decide on his own whether to accept or reject it.
Information Feedback. For the group-on-group treatments, group A members
observed only their own o⁄er and the ￿nal o⁄er sent to group B. Group B members
observed the ￿nal o⁄er, but not the other o⁄ers made by group A members. At the
end of each round, members of both groups were informed whether the ￿nal o⁄er
was accepted or rejected, the number of individual acceptance and rejection votes
(between 0 and 3) in the responder group, and the number of points obtained by
their group in that round. For the one-on-one treatment, each agent learned whether
the o⁄er was accepted or rejected and her own amount of points obtained for that
round.7
Payo⁄s. The ￿nal payo⁄ for each treatment in the independent design was de-
termined by randomly selecting one of the 10 real rounds. For the sequential design,
the ￿nal payo⁄ for each bargaining situation was determined by randomly selecting
one round out of 10 real periods of each game played. The pay for the chosen period
was calculated as follows: Each group member got $2.6 Mexican pesos (about 23 US
cents) for each point obtained by her own group, in addition to the basic amount of
$20 pesos (roughly US$1.75) for participation. Thus, each pair of groups e⁄ectively
bargained over $780 pesos (around US$68 in year 2004 when the experimental sessions
where conducted). For the one-on-one treatment, each pair of agents had to bargain
over $260 pesos. In the sequential design one period was chosen for each of the games
7Note that the proposer group is observing the decision made by each member of the responder
group. Revealing this information could help proposers to update their beliefs about the probability
of individual and group rejection, and thus may induce some kind of learning behavior across periods.
19played, so that size of the pie was equal to $780 pesos ($260 pesos) for each game.
4 Experimental Results
This section compares the experimental results from the four treatments of ultima-
tum bargaining discussed in the previous section. We concentrate on measuring how
di⁄erent voting rules a⁄ect individual and group rejection rates and proposals.
Table 3 describes for the one-on-one treatment the distribution of individual pro-
posals and rejections aggregated across all ten periods. The o⁄er range indicates the
amount of points a proposer is willing to give to a responder. Consider, for example,
the o⁄er range from 35 to 39. In the one-on-one treatment, the number of proposals
within this range was 86 out of a total of 530 o⁄ers, 16.2% (86/530). Likewise, the
number of o⁄ers in this range rejected by the responders was 18, resulting in the
empirical rejection rate of 20.9% (18/86).
In the same table, we also provide the data for majority rule group-on-group
treatment. As in the one-on-one case, consider the o⁄er range from 35 to 39. The
total number of individual proposals within this range was 90, which makes up 17.6%
of the total of 510 o⁄ers in this treatment. Since just 1 out of 3 proposals was
randomly chosen to be sent to a responder group, the group proposals are simply a
random selection of the individual ones. The number of group proposals within this
range was 30 out of a total of 170 o⁄ers sent. Therefore, the group o⁄ers proportion
was 17.6% (30/170). Since all 3 members of a responder group received the same
o⁄er, the individual rejection number within this range was 29; with a total of 90
observations (30￿3), the individual rejection rate for this range was 32.2% (29/90).
At group level, the number of rejections within this range was 10 out of 30, resulting
in a 33.3% (10/30) group rejection rate. Table 4 provides the same information for
both unanimity treatments. At the bottom of Tables 3 and 4 some summary statistics
are shown for the o⁄ers made and rejected.
20Table 3: Summary of Experimental Results: One-on-One and Group Majority Rule
O⁄er One-on-One Majority Rule
Range Ind. O⁄. Ind. Rej. Ind. O⁄. Grp. O⁄. Ind. Rej. Grp. Rej.
> 50 2.8 0.0 4.7 4.7 0.0 0.0
(15) (0) (24) (8) (0) (0)
= 50 11.5 1.6 13.5 13.5 2.9 0.0
(61) (1) (69) (23) (2) (0)
45 - 49 18.1 5.2 16.5 16.5 7.1 3.6
(96) (5) (84) (28) (6) (1)
40 - 44 28.3 7.3 18.8 18.8 17.7 9.4
(150) (11) (96) (32) (17) (3)
35 - 39 16.2 20.9 17.6 17.6 32.2 33.3
(86) (18) (90) (30) (29) (10)
30 - 34 9.1 12.5 8.8 8.8 24.4 20.0
(48) (6) (45) (15) (11) (3)
25 - 29 8.3 38.6 11.8 11.8 30.0 25.0
(44) (17) (60) (20) (18) (5)
< 25 5.7 80.0 4.2 8.2 57.1 64.3
(30) (24) (42) (14) (24) (9)
All O⁄. 100.0 15.0 100.0 100.0 21.0 18.2
(530) (82) (510) (170) (107) (31)
Statistics
Avg. 40 29 38 40 31 28
Med. 40 30 40 40 35 31
Var. 138 137 229 230 115 127
Note: The number in parentheses below each percentage represents the
number of times the occurrence was observed.
21Table 4: Summary of Experimental Results: Group Unanimity Rules
O⁄er Unanimity with Rejection Default Unanimity with Acceptance Default
Range Ind. O⁄. Grp. O⁄. Ind. Rej. Grp. Rej. Ind. O⁄. Grp O⁄. Ind. Rej. Grp. Rej.
> 50 14.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 6.0 5.6 0.0
(42) (10) (0) (0) (24) (6) (1) (0)
= 50 12.7 10.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 3.0 0.0 0.0
(38) (10) (0) (0) (7) (3) (0) (0)
45 - 49 33.7 32.0 5.2 15.6 11.0 17.0 5.9 0.0
(101) (32) (5) (5) (33) (17) (3) (0)
40 - 44 18.0 20.0 13.3 25.0 16.3 19.0 19.3 0.0
(54) (20) (8) (5) (49) (19) (11) (0)
35 - 39 9.7 12.0 22.2 50.0 27.3 20.0 35.0 5.0
(29) (12) (8) (6) (82) (20) (21) (1)
30 - 34 7.0 9.0 33.3 66.7 15.7 17.0 49.0 17.6
(21) (9) (9) (6) (47) (17) (25) (3)
25 - 29 2.3 3.0 66.7 100.0 8.0 5.0 33.3 0.0
(7) (3) (6) (3) (24) (5) (5) (0)
< 25 2.7 4.0 91.7 100.0 11.3 13.0 59.0 23.1
(8) (4) (11) (4) (34) (13) (23) (3)
All O⁄. 100.0 100.0 15.7 29.0 100.0 100.0 29.7 7.0
(300) (100) (47) (29) (300) (100) (89) (7)
Statistics
Avg. 44 43 29 33 36 37 31 26
Med. 47 45 30 35 36 38 33 33
Var. 113 121 174 139 125 143 118 110
# Excl. 0 0
Note: The number in parentheses below each percentage represents the number of times the occurrence
was observed
224.1 Responder Behavior
We begin by checking whether individual voting behavior and group rejection rates
di⁄er across treatments, conditional on the o⁄er size. In particular, the model suggests
that individual rates of voting for rejection should not di⁄er across di⁄erent treatments
and that the group rejection rate for unanimity with rejection default should be higher
than for the one-on-one treatment, and these two higher than for the unanimity with
acceptance default. Meanwhile, majority rule rejection rate should be higher than for
the one-on-one treatment for P(x) < 1=2 and lower, otherwise.
In what follows we separately analyze the individual and group decisions. At in-
dividual level, each individual decision to accept (or vote to accept) or to reject (or
vote to reject) a speci￿c o⁄er is treated as one observation, while at group level, an
observation is each group decision to accept or to reject an o⁄er. At each level we
have a total of six di⁄erent treatments for which we observe rejection behavior: i)
decisions to accept/ reject by individuals who played a one-on-one ultimatum bar-
gaining only;8 ii ￿ iv) decisions by individuals/groups who played a group-on-group
ultimatum bargaining under a speci￿c voting rule only; v) decisions by individuals
who played a one-on-one ultimatum bargaining having previously experienced play-
ing group-on-group ultimatum bargaining under the majority voting rule; and vi)
decisions by individuals/groups who played a group-on-group ultimatum bargaining
under the majority voting rule having previously experienced playing one-on-one ul-
timatum bargaining game.
Subjects played multiple rounds of the bargaining game and each individual￿ s ac-
tions over time are clearly not independent. For this reason, as well as for comparison
with such earlier studies as Bornstein and Yaniv [2] and Messick et. al. [19], in which
subjects played the game only once, we initially attempted to test our hypotheses
using only data from a single period. However, the results of our statistical analysis
using data only from the ￿rst period are inconclusive, as are the results using data
8Here and in case (v) below, group and individual decisions are clearly tautologically the same.
23from the last period.9 While we are unable to reject the hypothesis that individual
probabilities of voting to reject, conditional on o⁄er size, are the same across the
treatments, neither do group rejection probabilities vary across treatments in a sta-
tistically signi￿cant way. But if agents￿individual voting behavior is the same in
di⁄erent treatments, this immediately implies that the group outcomes have to be
di⁄erent. Simply plugging numbers into a formula in section 2 one would observe
that if the probability of individual voting to reject a given o⁄er is, say 25%, then
under unanimity with acceptance default the three-person group will only reject with
less than 2% probability, while the unanimity with rejection default will result in the
rejection probability of nearly 58%. Since the two sets of coe¢ cients cannot simul-
taneously be equal to zero, no matter the actual behavior of individuals, we infer
that our sample size is insu¢ cient to make any conclusions from the single-period
observations.10 In what follows we instead present results of the statistical analysis
involving data from all 10 experimental rounds.11
We consider the following models for estimating individual and group rejection
probabilities:
Pr(Rejecti = 1) = F(￿ + ￿offerOfferi + ￿urdURD + ￿uadUAD + ￿mrMR




9Detailed regression results are available from the authors upon request.
10One should note, that our sample size is not particularly small by the literature standards.
Thus, Bornstein and Yaniv [2] have only 20 one-on-one and 20 group-on-group observations (they
only observe ￿nal group decisions). They observe only 2 rejections, making it di¢ cult to make
conclusions about rejection probabilities. Our failure to establish signi￿cant results using single-
period data also closely parallels that of Slonim and Roth [27] in their study of high-stakes ultimatum
bargaining. As they discuss in detail, a major problem is the lack of exogenous variation of o⁄ers,
which makes it hard to estimate the di⁄erence in conditional rejection probabilities across treatments
from one period data only, without observing many more subjects than is typical in a laboratory
experiment.
11In doing this we have adjusted our statistical analysis for individual-speci￿c e⁄ects. We also
report both individual- and group-level results to provide evidence that insigni￿cance of individual-
level coe¢ cients is not merely due to insu¢ cient sample size, as in the single-period case.
24Pr(Rejectk = 1) = F(￿ + ￿offerOfferk + ￿urdURD + ￿uadUAD + ￿mrMR




Model (1) checks whether di⁄erent voting rules a⁄ect individual rejection proba-
bility in addition to the o⁄er size, where Offeri is the o⁄er individual i receives from
0 to 100. Model (2) does the same for group rejection probability, where Offerk is
the o⁄er group k receives from 0 to 100. URD, UAD and MR are dummies for each
of the voting rules; EXPGNG is a dummy for those individuals (or groups mem-
bers) who played one-on-one ultimatum bargaining having ￿rst experienced playing
group-on-group ultimatum bargaining under the majority voting rule; EXPONO
is a dummy for those individuals (or groups) who played group-on-group ultimatum
bargaining under the majority voting rule having ￿rst experienced playing one-on-one
ultimatum bargaining; Perj is a dummy variable for every period, treating time as a
discrete variable; F(z) = 1
1+e￿z is the cumulative logistic distribution function; and
Reject = 1 means that an o⁄er was rejected. We use a random e⁄ect logit model to
account for individual and group variability. For both models, we expect the o⁄er size
coe¢ cient to be less than zero (￿offer < 0), meaning that the rejection probability
should be lower for higher o⁄ers. For model (1), we expect all treatment coe¢ cients
be equal to zero (￿urd = ￿uad = ￿mr = 0). For model (2), we should expect that the
unanimity treatment coe¢ cients di⁄er in sign (￿urd > 0, ￿uad < 0), where a positive
coe¢ cient should indicate a higher probability of rejection for a given o⁄er than a
negative coe¢ cient. This speci￿cation takes into account for majority rule the pos-
sibility of higher rejection rates for lower o⁄ers and lower rejection rates for higher
o⁄ers (￿mr > 0 and ￿mro < 0).
In Table 5 we present the logit estimations for rejection rate probability at both
individual (￿rst column) and group (second column) levels. For each of these models,
a ￿2 test indicates that the null hypothesis of all the estimated coe¢ cients being equal
zero can be rejected for a p < 0:0001. The o⁄er size coe¢ cients (￿offer) are correct
25Table 5: Probability of O⁄er Rejection for All Periods: Logit Estimation
Individual Group
Coe¢ cients Level Level
Intercept 4.970￿￿￿ 6.531￿￿￿
O⁄er -0.190￿￿￿ -0.239￿￿￿
Unanimity with 0.272 2.223￿￿￿
Rejection Default (p = 0.62)
Unanimity with 0.515 -2.966￿￿￿
Acceptance Default (p = 0.33)
Majority Rule 0.142 -2.752
(p = 0.77) (p = 0.06)
Majority￿O⁄er 0.075
(p = 0.08)
Experienced Group-on-Group -2.723￿ -0.829
Ultimatum Bargaining (p = 0.77)
Experienced One-on-One -1.808 0.340
Ultimatum Bargaining (p = 0.15) (p = 0.73)
Dummies for Period n.r.+ n.r.+
# of Obs. 1640 900
Log Likelihood -543.0 -259.5
￿: p<0.05, ￿￿: p<0.01 and ￿￿￿: p<0.001.
+: Insigni￿cant and not reported
26in sign and signi￿cant in both models.
For the model at individual level, none of the treatment coe¢ cients (￿urd; ￿uad
and ￿mr) show individual signi￿cance for a p < 0:05. A ￿2 test indicates that the
null hypothesis of ￿urd = ￿uad = ￿mr = 0 cannot be rejected for a p = 0:80. Our
estimation shows signi￿cance for the subjects￿prior experience playing a di⁄erent
version of the ultimatum bargaining game. In particular, those individuals who ex-
perienced playing the ultimatum within a group under the majority voting rule seem
to reduce the individual rejection probability when playing the one-on-one ultima-
tum. However, the reverse order of experience does not seem to be signi￿cant.12 A
￿2 test indicates that the null hypothesis of all time-period coe¢ cients being jointly
di⁄erent from zero can be rejected for a p = 0:02. However, most of the time-period
coe¢ cients are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero for a p < 0:05.13 Finally, a ￿2
test indicates that the null hypothesis of the voting rules, experience and time period
coe¢ cients being jointly equal to zero can be rejected for a p < 0:0001. This result
indicates that this model performs better than a speci￿cation that does not include
these dummy variables, indicating a possible role, at least, for time and experience
variables in explaining individual rejection probabilities. Figure 1 shows the expected
group rejection probabilities based on the rejection formulas in section 2 and on the
individual rejection response, P(x), estimated in model (1), when all dummies are
equal to zero.
For the model at group level, the coe¢ cients for both unanimity treatments are
signi￿cant and have the expected signs. On the other hand, the majority rule co-
e¢ cients (￿mr and ￿mro) exhibit opposite signs to what was expected. However,
none of these coe¢ cients are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero for a p < 0:05. Ad-
ditionally, a ￿2 test result indicates that the null hypothesis of ￿mr = ￿mro = 0
cannot be rejected (p = 0:164), indicating that we cannot really distinguish between
12A ￿2 test indicates that the null hypothesis of ￿expgog = ￿expono = 0 cannot be rejected for a
p = 0:08.
13Period ten coe¢ cient is the only signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero for a p = 0:001. It is signi￿cantly
lower than zero, indicating a reduction in the individual probability of rejection.







































Unanimity with Rejection Default
Unanimity with Acceptance Default
Figure 1: Expected Individual and Group Rejection Probabilities based on Individual
Response Estimation from model (1) (Column 1, Table 5)
the on-on-one and the group-on-group majority voting rule treatment in terms of
rejection probability. Overall, a ￿2 test result indicates that the null hypothesis of
￿urd = ￿uad = ￿mr = ￿mro = 0 can be rejected for a p < 0:0001, favoring the
joint signi￿cance of these treatment variables. None of the experience treatment and
time-period coe¢ cients show individual (or joint) signi￿cance for a p < 0:05. Thus,
experience and time do not contribute to explaining group rejection rate variations.
Finally, a ￿2 test indicates that the null hypothesis of the voting rules, experience and
time period coe¢ cients being jointly equal to zero can be rejected for a p < 0:0001.
This result indicates that this model performs better than a speci￿cation that does



























































Unanimity with Rejection Default
Unanimity with Acceptance Default
Majority Rule
Figure 2: Estimated Individual and Group Rejection Probabilities from model (2)
(Column 2, Table 5) and the Actual Rejection Rates
not include these dummy variables. Figure 2 shows estimated group rejection proba-
bilities from model (2) and the actual rejection rates for di⁄erent o⁄er intervals.
Summing up, the rejection probability estimations using the data set from all
ten periods show how di⁄erent voting rules a⁄ect individual and group responses
in ultimatum bargaining. On one hand, individuals tend to respond by voting in
the same way whether they are deciding within a group or alone, which supports
our model, as developed in the theory section. In particular, it suggests that we
are justi￿ed in modeling agents as only caring about the distribution of monetary
payo⁄s. On the other hand, di⁄erent voting rules a⁄ect group rejection probabilities
29as expected. Not surprisingly, smaller o⁄ers result in higher rejection probability.
Finally, we observe that time does not matter in predicting individual behavior. In
particular, the same o⁄ers are equally likely to be rejected over time. However,
subjects￿experience playing as a members of a group might in￿ uence rejection rates
when playing as individuals. We conclude that our qualitative comparative static
predictions for the rejection probabilities seem to hold.
4.2 Proposer Behavior
Given the di⁄erences in group rejection probabilities for di⁄erent voting rules, we
should expect changes in o⁄ers across treatments. We consider the following speci￿-
cation for estimating the o⁄er size di⁄erences across all treatments for the all periods:
Offeri = ￿0 + ￿urdURD + ￿uadUAD + ￿mrMR + ￿perPer
+ ￿perurdPer ￿ URD + ￿peruadPer ￿ UAD + ￿permrPer ￿ MR (3)
where Offeri is the o⁄er proposer i sent from 0 to 100; Per is the period time in which
an o⁄er was made; URD, UAD and MR are dummies for each of the voting rules. We
expect the o⁄er size coe¢ cient for unanimity with rejection default to be greater than
zero (￿urd > 0), meaning that compared to the one-on-one treatment proposers should
be willing to o⁄er more given the high rejection probability behind by this voting rule.
For unanimity with acceptance default, we should expect a coe¢ cient less than zero
(￿uad < 0), which means that compared to the one-on-one treatment proposers should
be willing to o⁄er less given the low probability of rejection. Compared to the one-
on-one treatment, proposers facing majority rule should be willing to o⁄er less when
P(x) < 1
4 and more otherwise. Therefore, it is di¢ cult to predict the coe¢ cient
sign associated to this treatment.14 This speci￿cation allows also the possibility of a
14We also considered a speci￿cation introducing dummies for subjects who experience making
o⁄ers under di⁄erent bargaining situations. However, the corresponding coe¢ cients were not jointly
di⁄erent from zero for a p < 0:05.














# of Obs. 1600
￿: p<0.05, ￿￿: p<0.01 and ￿￿￿: p<0.001.
di⁄erent dynamic within each treatment.15
For the one-on-one and majority rule, some subjects￿o⁄ers were excluded from
the statistical analysis. For the one-on-one and majority rule, some subjects￿o⁄ers
were excluded from the statistical analysis. For the one-on-one case, two subjects
were excluded: one subject that o⁄ered 100 for 8 consecutive periods and then 45
twice and another subject that o⁄ered 1 for 6 consecutive periods and then 15, 50,
15We also evaluated another model speci￿cation where a dummy variable for every period is
considered, treating time as a discrete variable. We reject the null hypothesis that all coe¢ cients were
jointly equal to zero for a p < 0:05. On the other hand, we could not reject the null hypothesis that
the discrete-time model is di⁄erent from a continuous-time speci￿cation for a p < 0:05, indicating
that the two may be indistinguishable; we decided to treat time as a continuos variable.
3130, 20. After excluding these two subjects, we consider 510 individual o⁄ers out of a
total of 530. For the majority rule, o⁄ers of two subjects were excluded: one subject
that o⁄ered 5 times more than 90 then 50 and then 4 times less than 15, and one that
o⁄ered 5 times more than 90, twice between 70 and 80, twice at 50 and then o⁄ered 1.
After excluding these subjects, we consider 490 individual o⁄ers out of a total of 510
individual o⁄ers.16 For both unanimity treatments, no subjects o⁄ers were excluded.
Table 6 shows the results of the random e⁄ect estimation. Our estimation shows
that the time period coe¢ cient (￿period) is signi￿cant for a p < 0:001, implying that
proposers were willing to o⁄er less over time. The unanimity with rejection default
coe¢ cient is di⁄erent from zero (p < 0:001), indicating that proposers tend to o⁄er
more than in the one-on-one treatment. The signs of the majority rule and unanimity
with acceptance default coe¢ cients are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero for a
p = 0:13 and p = 0:59, respectively. However, a ￿2 test result indicates that the
null hypothesis of ￿urd = ￿uad = ￿mr = 0 can be rejected for a p < 0:001. Our
speci￿cation allows for a di⁄erence in the dynamic within each treatment. A ￿2 test
result indicates that the null hypothesis of ￿perurd = ￿peruad = ￿permr = 0 can be
rejected for a p < 0:001, con￿rming the presence of such di⁄erence. In fact, ￿peruad
is clearly negative (signi￿cance at p < 0:001), which, compared with the insigni￿cant
sign of ￿uad, suggests that agents may be moving towards a correct response.17 We
also observe that proposals tend to increase over time faster in the group-on-group
majority rule than in the one-on-one treatment. Figure 3 shows the estimated o⁄ers
for each treatment in addition to the average of all individual o⁄ers (+/- 2 standard
16For the one-on-one treatment, we excluded subjects 63 and 74. For the majority rule treatment,
subjects 359 and 368 were excluded. Subjects 63, 359 and 368 reported in a questionary after the
session to be confused about the meaning of the o⁄er (i.e., whether it was the o⁄er to the responder
or the fraction retained by him). Subject 74, likely, took a game theory class and was aware of the
ultimatum bargaining game (in fact, one subject cried out, while leaving the room after that session:
"it is not rational!").
17From the raw data we observe that in the unanimity with acceptance default treatment proposers
were exposed to a higher-than-expected number of actual group rejections in early rounds (this
di⁄erence was not statistically signi￿cant), possibly making them cautious about aggressive o⁄ers.
The sign of the ￿peruad suggests that, as the impact of those early rejections wore o⁄, the proposers
did start to be more aggressive, as predicted by the model.
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Figure 3: Average Individual O⁄ers and Estimated O⁄ers
errors).
Summing up the results, our estimations indicate that o⁄ers decrease over time;
o⁄ers are higher for the unanimity with rejection default than for other treatments;
o⁄ers are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent for the other two voting rules compared to the con-
trol treatment; and while o⁄ers decrease over time in the unanimity with acceptance
default, they increase in the majority rule.
4.2.1 One-on-One vs. Group-on-Group Majority Rule
Sequential treatment was designed to try to distinguish between the one-on-one
and majority group behavior. Since the same individuals were proposers in both
33Table 7: Group-on-Group Majority Rule vs. One-on-One Ultimatum Bargaining
Coe¢ cients Average O⁄er MR
Intercept 21.275￿￿￿
Average O⁄er ONO 0.521￿￿￿
# of Obs. 24
￿: p<0.05, ￿￿: p<0.01 and ￿￿￿: p<0.001.
the one-on-one and majority rule games, our model suggests that we should expect
di⁄erent individual o⁄ers in the two bargaining situations. To test this hypothesis we
consider the following speci￿cation:
OfferMR
i = ￿ + ￿ OfferONO
i
where OfferMR
i is the average o⁄er proposer i made under the group-on-group ul-
timatum bargaining where the receiver group have to decide whether to accept un-
der the majority voting rule and OfferONO
i is the average o⁄er proposer i made
in the one-on-one ultimatum bargaining. We should expect the o⁄er size coe¢ cient
under the on-on-one ultimatum bargaining be greater than zero and less than one
(1 > ￿ > 0), meaning that those individuals that were less (more) aggressive as
proposer in a one-on-one ultimatum bargaining becomes somewhat more (less) ag-
gressive when playing against groups, and vice versa.18 Table 7 shows estimation
for this speci￿cation.19 Our estimation shows that average o⁄er coe¢ cient (￿) is
signi￿cant for a p < 0:001. We could reject the null hypothesis that this coe¢ cient
was greater than or equal to one (less than or equal to zero) for a p < 0:001. This
result is consistent with the expected changes in the individual average o⁄ers across
18This does not mean that agents "aggressiveness ranking" should switch - the same agents would
be making relatively high (respectively, relatively low) o⁄ers in both situations.
19We also evaluated another model speci￿cation where a dummy variable for the order in which
agents played the games is considered. For this speci￿cation, we could not reject the null hypothesis
that this coe¢ cient was di⁄erent from zero for a p = 0:41. Therefore, the order in which agents ￿nd
themselves in di⁄erent bargaining situations does not contribute to explaining o⁄er variation.














































































Figure 4: Average Individual O⁄ers
bargaining situations. Figure 4 shows for each individual his/her average o⁄ers under
each of the bargaining situations (note our regression crossing the 45￿ line).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we provide a comparison between four di⁄erent treatments of ultima-
tum bargaining: the one-on-one bargaining and three di⁄erent group-on-group games
di⁄erentiated by the controlled decision rule used on the responder side to agree on
acceptance or rejection. The results of our experiments seem to support the following
conclusions:
We cannot reject the hypothesis that individual responder behavior is the same in
all four treatments. The willingness to reject low o⁄ers clearly suggests existence of
a non-monetary component in individual payo⁄s. The absence of di⁄erence between
35the behavior inside and outside the group suggests that this behavior could be fully
explained by assuming that agents care about the distribution of monetary payo⁄s
among the bargainers (possibly, due to their dislike of being treated unfairly). The in-
dividual responder behavior does generate statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences in group
responder behavior, implying that proposers should adjust their o⁄ers depending on
the treatment.
We can reject the hypothesis that the proposer behavior is the same in all four
treatments. In particular, in the unanimity with rejection default treatment proposers
are clearly substantially more cautious than in other treatments, which indicates that
they correctly respond to the increased di¢ culty of obtaining acceptance of their pro-
posals. We also observe di⁄erences in proposers￿behavior between the one-on-one
bargaining and the other treatments of group bargaining. In particular, while in the
unanimity with acceptance default treatment we fail to observe proposers to be on
average more aggressive, we do observe them becoming more aggressive with time.
One reason for this delay may be that, though the observed di⁄erence in responder be-
havior between the unanimity with acceptance default and the one-on-one treatments
is not statistically signi￿cant, the realization of the individual conditional rejection
probability in this treatment happened to be somewhat high in initial rounds, possi-
bly ￿training￿the agents to behave somewhat more cautiously. Furthermore, results
of our sequential treatment suggest that individual behavior between one-on-one and
majority rule treatments is varying in a predicted fashion.
It is suggested by the previous discussion that proposers may be best-responding
to empirical rejection probabilities they face. Furthermore, there does seem to be
evidence that agents learn the ￿correct￿ behavior over time. Further research is
needed to establish exactly the nature of this learning process and how it responds
to the empirical rejection.
366 Appendix 1: Experimental Instructions
The following is the verbatim translation (from Spanish into English) of experimental in-
structions administered to subjects at ITAM (the Spanish original is available from the
authors upon request).
6.1 Instructions Group-on-Group
This is an experiment about decision-making. The instructions are simple and if you follow
them carefully and take good decisions, you can earn a CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF
MONEY, which will be PAID YOU IN CASH at the end of the experiment
General Proceedings
In this experiment you will participate as a member of a GROUP A or a GROUP B.
Your participation as a part of one of these two groups shall be determined at the beginning
of the experiment and will be constant during the entire session. Each group shall consist
solely of three (3) participants.
The experiment shall consist of 12 periods: two practice periods, and 10 periods played
for money, one of which shall be randomly selected at the end of the experiment to determine
your ￿nal pay. For this reason you should consider each period as if it were ￿the chosen
period￿for your pay.
At the beginning of each period, each TYPE A GROUP will interact with a TYPE B
GROUP. The formation of pairs of GROUPS A and B will be done randomly. Likewise,
the membership composition of each group will change in a random fashion, so that each
participant will form a part of a new GROUP (of the same type) at the beginning of each
period.
Speci￿c Proceedings
In each period the task of each pair of groups is to try to divide 100 points using the
following rules.
1) The members of GROUP A must make an o⁄er of points to members of GROUP B.
1.1) To make the ￿nal o⁄er from GROUP A to GROUP B each member of GROUP A
must write and send an o⁄er via the computer. Each o⁄er must be in the range of 0 to 100
points.
1.2) After that, one of these o⁄ers made shall be chosen randomly by the computer as
the ￿nal o⁄er of GROUP A to GROUP B.
2) The ￿nal o⁄er of GROUP A shall be sent to each member of GROUP B. After
observing the o⁄er sent, the members of GROUP B must decide if they accept of reject the
o⁄er according to the following rule:
The o⁄er is considered accepted when every one of the members of the group votes to
accept it. Otherwise it is considered rejected.20
20This corresponds to Unanimity with rejection default; instructions for other treatments
are as follows.
Unanimity with acceptance default:
￿The o⁄er is considered rejected when every one of the members of the group votes to
accept it. Otherwise it is considered accepted￿ .
Majority rule:
￿The o⁄er is considered accepted when at least two of the members of the group vote to
accept it. Otherwise it is considered rejected.￿
372.1) If GROUP B rejects the o⁄er, no GROUP receives any pay.
2.2) If GROUP B accepts the o⁄er, the GROUP A receives the amount of 100 points
minus the points o⁄ered to GROUP B. In its turn, GROUP B receives the amount of points
which has been o⁄ered by GROUP A.
3) Once taken, the decision to accept or reject the o⁄er of points is ￿nal, no counter-o⁄er
shall be possible, and the next period shall start with a new grouping of participants for
each group type.
Payment Proceedings
Once the 10 periods played for money are over, one of them will be chosen randomly to
determine the ￿nal pay. For this reason, you should consider each period as if it were ￿nal
￿chosen period￿for your pay.
The pay for the chosen period shall be calculated as follows: Each member of each
group shall get $2.6 pesos for each point obtained by the group to which shenhe belongs, in
addition to the basic amount of $20 pesos for participation.
At the end of the session, each of the participants shall be called by the identi￿cation
number assigned by the computer at the beginning of the experiment to receive his/her pay
in a sealed envelope, thus ensuring the complete anonymity of his/her decisions and their
results.
6.2 Instructions One-on-One
This is an experiment about decision-making. The instructions are simple and if you follow
them carefully and take good decisions, you can earn a CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF
MONEY, which will be PAID YOU IN CASH at the end of the experiment
General Proceedings
In this experiment you will participate as a TYPE A or TYPE B AGENT. Your partic-
ipation as one of these agent types shall be determined at the beginning of the experiment
and will be constant during the entire session
The experiment shall consist of 12 periods: two practice periods, and 10 periods played
for money, one of which shall be randomly selected at the end of the experiment to determine
your ￿nal pay. For this reason you should consider each period as if it were ￿the chosen
period￿for your pay.
At the beginning of each period, each TYPE A AGENT will interact with a TYPE B
AGENT. The formation of pairs of TYPE A and TYPE B AGENTS will be done randomly.
Speci￿c Proceedings
In each period the task of each pair of agents is to try to divide 100 points using the
following rules.
1) Each TYPE A AGENT must make an o⁄er of points to a TYPE B AGENT. For this
each TYPE A AGENT must write and send an o⁄er via the computer. Each o⁄er must be
in the range of 0 to 100 points.
2) After observing the o⁄er sent by the TYPE A AGENT, the TYPE B AGENT must
decide if shenhe accepts or rejects it.
2.1) If the TYPE B AGENT rejects the o⁄er, no AGENT receives any pay.
2.2) If TYPE B AGENT accepts the o⁄er, the TYPE A AGENT receives the amount
of 100 points minus the points o⁄ered to TYPE B AGENT. In its turn, TYPE B AGENT
receives the amount of points which has been o⁄ered by TYPE A AGENT.
383) Once taken, the decision to accept or reject the o⁄er of points is ￿nal, no counter-o⁄er
shall be possible, and the next period shall start with a new grouping of agent pairs.
- Payment Proceedings
Once the 10 periods played for money are over, one of them will be chosen randomly to
determine the ￿nal pay. For this reason you should consider each period as if it were ￿nal
￿chosen period￿for your pay.
The pay for the chosen period shall be calculated as follows: Each agent shall get $2.6
pesos for each point obtained, in addition to the basic amount of $20 pesos for participation.
At the end of the session, each of the participants shall be called by the identi￿cation
number assigned by the computer at the beginning of the experiment to receive his/her pay
in a sealed envelope, thus ensuring the complete anonymity of his/her decisions and their
results.
* * *
In the sequential treatment, after the completion of the ￿rst 10 rounds the subjects
were asked to move to a next-door classroom, while the computers were being reinitialized.
The subjects were monitored throughout and no communication was allowed. When the
subjects returned to the room where the experiment was being conducted, the appropriate
instructions were read to them in their entirety before proceeding.
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